Yesterday, a friend sent me a government Press Release.
On 17 October 2019 the Intelligence and Security of Parliament
submitted to the government a report into Russian influence in Britain. The
report was the result of an extensive Inquiry by the Committee. The Committee noted
that because of the security sensitivities of its enquiry, the report had to undergo
a process of review in four stages, the last of which is confirmation by the
Prime Minister that the report does not prejudice the work of any of the
government’s security agencies. The committee noted that this process usually
takes four months.
The report was published yesterday, some 29 months after it was
submitted to government. In other words, Boris Johnson delayed publication of a
very important report for more than two years and slipped it into the public
domain in the midst of the Ukrainian invasion to bury it as deeply as possible
in the news media.
Only he can know why. However, it is notable that:
·
The report states that, while the US
government published an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
Presidential election, the UK government failed to enquire into Russian interference
in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Johnson was, of course, a leading proponent of
Brexit, so such an investigation might have questioned the very event that led him
to power.
·
After the 2019 election, Johnson attempted to
impose as chair of the committee one of his Brexit cronies, Chris Grayling
(popularly known as “Failing Grayling”). This manoeuvre failed.
·
The report notes Russian links to influential
figures in Britain, and the failure of a number of governments to pay any
attention to the security implications of this influence. It is worth noting
that a number of Russian oligarchs resident in the UK have been large donors to
the Conservative Party (although the report does not refer to this – both Conservative
and MPs and MPs from other parties sit on the committee, so perhaps this is not
surprising).
Of course, this report did not warn the government that Russia
might invade Ukraine, but it did raise some very important questions for the
government, which it ignored until such time as the questions are more or less
moot.
I am copying here the press release that accompanied publication of
the report. I have highlighted some points that seem particularly relevant to today’s
crisis.
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT
PRESS NOTICE
Intelligence
and Security Committee of Parliament publish predecessor’s Russia Report
“This
Report is the result of an extensive Inquiry by the previous Committee. We
would like
to take this
opportunity to thank the Chair of that Committee, Dominic Grieve QC, and the
former
members of the ISC for all their work: it is a matter of great regret that it
was not
published
last November, ahead of the General Election. The following press notice is
that
written by
the previous Committee.
Intelligence
and Security Committee questions whether Government took
its eye
off the ball on Russia, finds that they underestimated the response
required
to the Russian threat and are still playing catch up:
·
Russian influence in the UK is the new normal.
Successive
Governments
have welcomed the oligarchs and their money with open
arms,
providing them with a means of recycling illicit finance through
the London
‘laundromat’, and connections at the highest levels with
access to
UK companies and political figures.
·
This
has led to a growth industry of ‘enablers’ including lawyers,
accountants,
and estate agents who are – wittingly or unwittingly – de
facto
agents of the Russian state.
·
It clearly demonstrates the inherent tension
between the Government’s
prosperity
agenda and the need to protect national security. While we
cannot now
shut the stable door, greater powers and transparency are
needed
urgently.
·
UK is clearly a target for Russian
disinformation. While the mechanics
of our
paper-based voting system are largely sound, we cannot be
complacent
about a hostile state taking deliberate action with the aim of
influencing
our democratic processes.
·
Yet the defence of those democratic processes
has appeared
something
of a ‘hot potato’, with no one organisation considering itself
to be in
the lead, or apparently willing to conduct an assessment of
such
interference. This must change.
·
Social media companies must take action and
remove covert hostile
state material:
Government must ‘name and shame’ those who fail to
act.
·
We need other countries to step up with the UK
and attach a cost to
Putin’s
actions. Salisbury must not be allowed to become the high water
mark in
international unity over the Russia threat.
·
A number of issues addressed in this published
version of the Russia
Report are
covered in more depth in the Classified Annex. We are not
able to
discuss these aspects on the grounds of national security.
“The UK is
one of Russia’s top Western intelligence targets: particularly given the UK’s
firm
stance
against recent Russian aggression and the UK-led international response to the
2018
Salisbury
attack. Russia’s intelligence services are disproportionately large and
powerful and, given the lack of rule of law, are able to act without
constraint. The fusion between state, business, and serious and organised
crime provides further weight and leverage: Russia is able to pose an
all-encompassing security threat – which is fuelled by paranoia about the West
and a desire to be seen as a resurgent great power.
“Russia is
a highly capable cyber actor, employing organised crime groups to supplement
its
cyber
skills. Russia carries out malicious cyber activity in order to assert itself
aggressively -
for
example, attempting to interfere in other countries’ elections. It has also
undertaken cyber pre-positioning on other countries’ Critical National
Infrastructure. Given the immediate threat this poses to our national
security, we are concerned that there is no clear coordination of the
numerous organisations across the UK intelligence community working on this
issue, this is reinforced by an unnecessarily complicated wiring diagram of
responsibilities amongst Ministers.
“We do
however welcome the Government’s increasingly assertive approach when it comes
to
identifying, and laying blame on, the perpetrators of cyber attacks and the UK
should
encourage
other countries to adopt a similar approach to ‘naming and shaming’. The same
is true in relation to an international doctrine on the use of Offensive Cyber:
this is now
essential
and the UK – as a leading proponent of the Rules Based International Order –
should be
promoting and shaping Rules of Engagement, working with our allies.
“Russia’s
promotion of disinformation and attempts at political influence overseas -
whether
through
the use of social media, hack and leak operations, or its state-owned
traditional media - have been widely reported. In the UK, the use of a
highly-dispersed paper-based voting and counting system makes actual
interference with the mechanism difficult, but we should not be complacent
about other forms of interference: the UK is clearly a target and must
equip itself to counter such efforts.
“Yet this
Inquiry found it surprisingly difficult to establish who has responsibility:
the
defence of
the UK’s democratic processes has appeared to be something of a ‘hot potato’,
with no
single organisation identifying itself as having an overall lead. We understand
the
nervousness
around any suggestion that the intelligence Agencies might be involved in the
mechanics
of the democratic process, but that does not apply when it comes to the
protection of those processes. And without seeking to imply that those
organisations currently responsible are not capable, the Committee have
questioned whether DCMS and the Electoral Commission have the weight and access
required to tackle a major hostile state threat. Democracy is intrinsic to
our country’s success and well-being. Protecting it must be a ministerial
priority, with the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism taking the policy
lead and the operational role sitting with MI5.
“In terms
of responsibility, it was noted that – as with so many other issues currently –
it is
the social
media companies who hold the key but are failing to play their part. The
Government
must establish a protocol with these companies to ensure that they take covert
hostile
state use of their platforms seriously, with agreed deadlines within which such
material
will be removed, and Government should ‘name and shame’ those which fail to
act.
“There
have been widespread allegations that Russia sought to influence voters in the
2016
referendum
on the UK’s membership of the EU: studies have pointed to the preponderance
of pro-Brexit or anti-EU stories on RT and Sputnik, and the use of ‘bots’ and
‘trolls’, as
evidence. The
actual impact of such attempts on the result itself would be difficult – if not
impossible
– to prove. However what is clear is that the Government was slow to recognise
the
existence of the threat – only understanding it after the ‘hack and leak’
operation against the Democratic National Committee, when it should have been
seen as early as 2014. As a result the Government did not take action to
protect the UK’s process in 2016. The Committee has not been provided with
any post-referendum assessment - in stark contrast to the US response to
reports of interference in the 2016 presidential election. In our view there must
be an analogous assessment of Russian interference in the EU referendum.
“What is
clear is that Russian influence in the UK is ‘the new normal’: successive
Governments
have welcomed the Russian oligarchy with open arms, and there are a lot of
Russians
with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business,
political
and social
scene - in ‘Londongrad’ in particular. Yet few, if any, questions have been
asked
regarding
the provenance of their considerable wealth and this ‘open door’ approach
provided ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through
the London
‘laundromat’.
It is not just the oligarchs either - the arrival of Russian money has resulted
in a growth industry of ‘enablers’: lawyers, accountants, and estate agents
have all played a role, wittingly or unwittingly, and formed a “buffer” of
Westerners who are de facto agents of the Russian state.
“There is
an obvious inherent tension between the Government’s prosperity agenda and the
need to
protect national security. To a certain extent, this cannot be untangled and
the priority now must be to mitigate the risk, and ensure that where hostile
activity is uncovered, the proper tools exist to tackle it at source and to
challenge the impunity of Putin-linked elites. It is notable, for example,
that a number of Members of the House of Lords have business interests linked
to Russia, or work directly for major Russian companies linked to the Russian state
– these relationships should be carefully scrutinised, given the potential for
the Russian state to exploit them.
“In addition
to the Putin-linked elites, the UK is also home to a number of Putin’s critics
who
have
sought sanctuary in the UK fearing politically-motivated charges and
harassment, and
the events
of 4 March 2018 showed the vulnerability of former Russian intelligence
officers
who have
settled in the UK – one of the issues we address in the Classified Annex to our
Report.
“It has
been clear for some time that Russia under Putin has moved from potential
partner to established threat, fundamentally unwilling to adhere to
international law – the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 and the
annexation of Crimea in 2014 were stark indicators of this. We therefore
question whether the Government took its eye off the ball because of its focus
on counter-terrorism: it was the opinion of the Committee that until recently
the
Government
had badly underestimated the response required to the Russian threat –and is
still
playing catch up. Russia poses a tough intelligence challenge and our
intelligence
Agencies
must have the tools they need to tackle it. In particular, new legislation must
be
introduced
to tackle foreign spies: the Official Secrets Act is not fit for purpose and
while this goes unrectified the UK intelligence community’s hands are tied.
“More
broadly, we need a continuing international consensus against Russian
aggressive
action.
Effective constraint of nefarious Russian activities in the future will rely on
making
sure that
the price the Russians pay for such interference is sufficiently high: the West
is
strongest
when it acts collectively, and the UK has shown it can lead the international
response.
The expulsion of 153 ‘diplomats’ from 29 countries and NATO following the use
of
chemical weapons on UK soil in the Salisbury attack was unprecedented and,
together
with the
subsequent exposure of the GRU agents responsible, sent a strong message that
such actions would not be tolerated. But Salisbury must not be allowed to
become the high water mark in international unity over the Russia threat: we
must build on this effort to ensure momentum is not lost.”
NOTES TO
EDITORS
1. The
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is a statutory
committee of
Parliament
that has responsibility for oversight of the UK Intelligence Community. The
Committee
was originally established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, and was
reformed, and its powers reinforced, by the Justice and Security Act 2013.
2. The
Committee oversees the intelligence and security activities of the UK,
including the policies, expenditure, administration and operations of MI5, MI6
(the Secret Intelligence Service or SIS) and the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ). The Committee also scrutinises the work of the other parts
of the Intelligence Community , including the Joint Intelligence Organisation
and the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office; Defence
Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence; and the Office for Security and
Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office.
3. The
Committee consists of nine members drawn from both Houses of Parliament, and
appointed by Parliament. The Chair is elected by its Members. The Members of
the Committee are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989
and are routinely given access to highly classified material in carrying out
their duties.
4. This
Report was prepared by the previous Committee:
The Rt
Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP (Chair)
The Rt
Hon. Richard Benyon MP
Stewart
Hosie MP
The Rt
Hon. Caroline Flint MP
The Rt
Hon. David Hanson MP
The Rt
Hon. the Lord Janvrin GCB GCVO QSO
The Rt
Hon. Kevan Jones MP
The Most
Hon. the Marquess of Lothian QC PC
The Rt
Hon. Keith Simpson MP
5. The
present Committee Members are:
The Rt
Hon. Dr Julian Lewis MP (Chair)
The Rt
Hon. Chris Grayling MP
The Rt
Hon. Sir John Hayes CBE MP
Stewart Hosie
MP
Dame Diana
Johnson DBE MP
The Rt
Hon. Kevan Jones MP
Mark
Pritchard MP
The Rt
Hon. Theresa Villiers MP
The Rt
Hon. Admiral Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC
6. The
Committee sets its own agenda and work programme. It takes evidence from
Government Ministers, the Heads of the intelligence and security Agencies,
officials from UKIC, and other witnesses as required. The Committee makes an
Annual Report on the discharge of its functions and also produces Reports on
specific issues.
7. The
Committee receives highly classified evidence, much of which cannot be
published without damaging the operational capabilities of the intelligence
Agencies. There is therefore a lengthy process to prepare the Committee’s
reports ready for publication, which consists of four stages and takes
around four months. The fourth stage is for the Prime Minister to confirm
under the Justice and Security Act that there is no material remaining in the
report which would prejudice the discharge of the functions of the Agencies (by
this point this has already been confirmed by the Agencies themselves). It has
previously been agreed that the Prime Minister would have ten working days in
which to provide this confirmation, before the Report is laid before
Parliament. The Committee’s report on Russia was sent to the Prime Minister on
17 October 2019.