British General Election

Parliament has just agreed to hold a general election on 12 December. The government claims that an election is necessary to “get Brexit done” and blames Parliament, and in particular the Labour Party and, in very personal attacks, its leader for the delay. Since this is the principal explanation of why we need an early election, it bears some scrutiny, which will in turn throw light on the real motivation for an election.

To begin at the beginning, the Conservatives have been the principal governing party since 2010: 2010-2015 in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, 2015-2017 with a small overall majority, 2017-summer 2019 with a majority formed by a pact with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and since the summer of 2019 a minority government as a result of the Prime Minister’s own actions.

The Conservatives loathed five years of coalition and, rather to their own surprise, won a small majority in 2015, partly by inflicting a heavy defeat on their coalition partners. However, the Conservatives entered the 2015 election terrified that the new UKIP (UK Independence) party would erode is electoral base. Therefore, Prime Minister Cameron included in his election manifesto a promise of an “In or Out Referendum” on EU membership after he had negotiated new arrangements with the EU. To his surprise, Mr Cameron won the election with a small majority. Mr. Cameron advocated remaining in the EU, but, much to his surprise, in the 2016 referendum 52% voted to leave. Mr Cameron had made no plans for a Leave majority. Although he had promised to implement the result of the referendum, he promptly resigned, leaving his successor to devise a plan. The lack of planning suggests hubris, if not incompetence, perhaps both.

The Conservatives then chose Theresa May, the Home Secretary, to be the new Prime Minister. At this point there was no definition of what leaving the EU meant, no evaluation of what the implications were, nor how to achieve it. In short, the Conservatives had invited the electorate to make a decision of momentous import, but had not thought to work out how to implement the decision. Mrs May faced a party divided into two broad camps: the pro-EU MPs, most of whom decided to put to one side their personal judgement and support leaving, and those fiercely opposed to EU membership (many of them members of the blandly named European Research Group).

At this stage Mrs May’s task was to devise a plan and persuade her own party to support it. Now, the EU treaty stipulates that a country that wishes to leave must first give two years’ notice of its intention. Rather than devise her plan, give notice and then negotiate the terms of withdrawal, Mrs May chose to give notice with no plan whatsoever. She therefore wasted part of the two years’ notice period working out a plan.

Then, in 2017, she had a clever idea. The Labour Party and its leader were so unpopular that she would call an election and win a large majority. Mrs May turned out to be incapable of mounting an effective election campaign and Labour’s Mr Corbyn proved to be a much more effective campaigner than Mrs May expected. The election gave her the largest group of MPs in Parliament, but not an overall majority. She remained Prime Minister, but had to agree a pact with the DUP to secure a majority in Parliament. She had by now wasted more time, first devising a plan, then halting negotiations with the EU to call an election, then negotiating a pact with the DUP.

Mrs May succeeded in negotiating an agreement with the EU, but then found to her great dismay that the ERG wing of her party was opposed to it, so was the formerly pro-EU wing, and so was the DUP. In short, Mrs May failed to win the support of her own side. In this situation, the opposition of the Labour Party was neither here nor there. Mrs May was the author of her own fate.

Mrs May resigned as Prime Minister earlier this year. The Conservative Party then elected Boris Johnson as leader. Mr Johnson vowed that the UK would leave the EU on 31 October “do or die” and with or without a deal. In short, he allied himself with the ERG wing of his party even more firmly than Mrs May had done. He also expelled from the government (unless they resigned first) any members of the government who would not support his approach. This created a group of 20 or more opponents on the formerly pro-Eu wing of the party. His plan can be summarized as follows:

·      Initially, to to make a show of refusing even to talk to the EU so as to convince them that he fully intended to leave without a deal, and to show those opposed to the EU that he was one of them

·      To suppress opposition in Parliament by proroguing (suspending sittings) for five weeks. This was subsequently ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court

·      Then to negotiate an agreement with the EU in such a way as to leave minimal time for Parliament to scrutinize its content

·      In the event that he were unable to secure approval for his agreement, to call a general election on the argument that Parliament was frustrating the will of the people

This plan immediately took a turn for the worse. Before it was prorogued Parliament passed a bill requiring Mr Johnson to write to the EU to ask for an extension of membership if an agreement with the EU had not been approved by 19 October. Despite declaring that he would not do so, Mr Johnson sent the letter but refused to sign it. Twnety one Conservative MPS from the formerly pro-EU wing of the Conservative party voted for this bill. Mr Johnson expelled them from the party. Thus, even with the support of the 10 DUP MPs, Mr Johnson had destroyed his own majority. In short, both Mrs May and Mr Johnson themselves took decisions that deprived them of a majority in Parliament.

Mr Johnson succeeded in negotiation a modified version of Mrs May’s agreement. The revised agreement won the support of the ERG, but the DUP fundamentally opposes it because it requires an internal customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Mr Johnson had previously stated that no British Prime Minister could ever agree to such an arrangement. He now promptly agreed to just such an arrangement. Essentially, by choosing to expel members of his own party, and by negotiating an agreement that the DUP was bound to reject, he guaranteed his inability to pass his own agreement, and then blamed the opposition for his impotence.

Mr Johnson then put his agreement to Parliament. Parliament agreed the deal in principle by a majority of 30 votes, but Mr Johnson insisted that the House be allowed only three days to consider the most important change in the country’s constitution, social and economic arrangements in a half century or more. Parliament refused to accept this expedited timetable. Mr Johnson then withdrew the agreement from further consideration. In short, Parliament did not oppose the agreement, but rather asserted its duty to scrutinize it.

At this point a brief aside concerning minority governments is useful. Minority governments and/or coalitions are the norm in many other European countries. The British system assumes that a single party wins a majority of Parliamentary seats and that the leader of that party becomes Prime Minister. However, it is perfectly possible to rule with a minority of MPs. This requires political skills, negotiate and compromise, as previous minority governments have shown. A Prime Minister is not obliged to call for an election simply because (s)he lacks a majority.

However, Mr Johnson’s response to Parliament’s insistence on scrutinizing his agreement was to demand an election. In the past, the Prime Minister was able to call a general election at will. However, since 2011 when the Conservative-Liberal coalition government passed the Fixed Term Parliament Act, elections can be held every five years or at an earlier date provided that 66% of MPs vote for an election. Mr Johnson attempted to call an election but the Labour Party refused to vote in favour. In essence, the opposition had him where they wanted him: powerless to proceed as he wished, unwilling to negotiate and at the mercy of other parties. You might ask how it is that we are now to have an election on 12 December. The answer is that the opposition was not united. First the Scottish National Party, and then the Liberal Party, both for their own reasons of electoral advantage, proposed a one-time bill to call for an election by a simple majority vote. Labour then concurred.

Until we have heard what each party proposes, we cannot decide how we will vote. The commentators predict that the outcome is extremely volatile and uncertain. However, I think we can confidently state that Mr Johnson’s argument that the Labour Party and its leader are solely responsible for his failure to achieve Brexit by 31 October is untrue. The failure is the result of years of poor decisions and incompetent political leadership on the part of three Prime Ministers, all of them Conservative.